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Does a Kick in the Pants Get You 
Going or Does It Just Hurt? 
The Impact of International 
Competition on Technological 
Change in U.S. Manufacturing 
Robert Z. Lawrence 
International competition and technological change are frequently treated 
as independent sources of change. Anne Krueger (1980) pointed out, for 
example, that productivity  growth was a far more important source of 
employment shifts in U.S. manufacturing than import competition. Simi- 
larly, the debate over growing wage inequality in the United States over 
the past 2 decades has been split between those emphasizing trade and 
those emphasizing technological change. There are, however, reasons to 
question the implicit assumption that trade and technology are indepen- 
dent causes. Indeed, it is  likely that causation runs in both directions. 
Changes in technology are surely an explanation for trade flows and inter- 
national  competition  could  well  affect  technological  change.  Ignoring 
these interactions could be seriously misleading.’ In particular, if interna- 
tional competition induces technological change, it could be a more im- 
portant source of employment and wage changes than studies assuming 
their independence might conclude. 
Moreover,  the  effect  of  international  competition  on  technological 
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1. Kapstein (1996), for example, dismisses the studies that have found a strong role for 
technology and a weak role for trade on the grounds that trade has induced technological 
change. Similarly, Wood (1994, 167) has argued that “in the North many firms have reacted 
to Southern  competition  by  devising new  production  techniques that  use  less unskilled 
labor.” 
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change is an important subject in its own right. It is often argued that the 
dynamic effects of free trade, for example, are far more important than 
the static benefits that come from improved resource allocation. Indeed, 
it is these dynamic effects that are believed to explain the evidence that 
more-open economies grow faster (Sachs and Warner 1995). 
In this paper, therefore,  after a brief conceptual review, I explore the 
effect of international competition on technological change empirically. 
Empirical work is particularly  important since this effect is theoretically 
ambiguous. Competition could indeed  spur innovation but it could also 
stifle it by making it less profitable. “Sometimes,” as the saying goes, “a  kick 
in the pants gets you going,” but “sometimes it just hurts.” However, re- 
solving this issue in the data is no easy matter because “trade” and “tech- 
nological  change”  are endogenous as well  as interdependent  variables.* 
One major challenge for this work, therefore, is dealing with issues of simul- 
taneity. Indeed, throughout  this paper I will show how results obtained 
using  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) specifications  may  be  dramatically 
changed when endogeneity is controlled for. A second major challenge lies 
in selecting appropriate measures of technology and international compe- 
tition. In the paper  I will proxy  “international competition”  with both 
price and quantity measures, and “technology”  with measures  of  total 
factor productivity (TFP) and the skill ratio (i.e., the ratio of employment 
of workers with some college education to those with a high school degree 
or less). 
In this paper  I will present  results in which both price and quantity 
measures suggest that import competition had a positive impact on U.S. 
TFP growth in manufacturing in the 1980s. This impact was larger in in- 
dustries that are relatively less skill intensive and on average stronger in 
industries competing with developing countries. In the face of an elastic 
demand for the products of these industries, therefore,  this effect would 
have actually raised the relative wages of less-skilled workers. I will also 
present evidence that import competition may have stimulated the rising 
skill intensity in manufacturing. This effect could have contributed to the 
rising skill premium. 
6.1  Theory 
It is not a simple matter to predict and measure the impact of increased 
international  competition  on  the  rate  and  direction  of  technological 
change at the industry level. One difficulty relates to the ambiguity of the 
effects in theory, another to the practical problems in distinguishing tech- 
nical change from other shifts in resource allocation.  There are several 
theoretical considerations that suggest that the impact of increased inter- 
2. See Deardorff and Hakura (1994). Impact of International Competition on Technological Change  199 
national competition on innovation (1) could be either negative or positive 
and (2) could well differ in export and import-competing industries. 
One impact of international competition could come from “learning by 
doing.” Productivity growth could be related to the scale of operation. To 
the degree that these effects are external to the firm but related to the size 
of the industry, we might expect to see positive effects in export industries 
that expand in response to increased trade and negative effects in import- 
competing sectors that would contract in response to trade. 
A second impact could stem from “learning by  watching.” Trade will 
expose firms to new competitors and ideas. To the degree they are able to 
learn from foreign competitors, this could stimulate innovation in all ex- 
posed sectors. In this case, the effects should be positive for both export 
and import-competing sectors. 
A  third  impact  could  occur  through  endogenous  responses  to  the 
changes in market structure as a result of increased international competi- 
tion. Here, as with competition in general, the arguments are varied. On 
the one hand, there is the view, often ascribed to Hicks, that “monopolists 
seek the quiet life” and will tend to rest on their laurels and avoid innova- 
tions, particularly when these might undermine the rents they enjoy from 
existing technologies. In this view, the increased rivalry over market share 
gives competitive firms a greater incentive to develop new products and 
processes that will help them defend their market position. On the other 
hand, there is  the view  of  Schumpeter that too much competition can 
retard innovation, particularly if the rewards from innovation are rapidly 
eroded. Indeed, the rationale for patents rests precisely on the view that 
temporary  monopolies  are required  to induce innovation.  In addition, 
even monopolists may have incentives to innovate strategically to continue 
to exclude rivals and to reduce production costs. In fact, it is likely that 
neither perfect competition nor pure monopoly are conducive to innova- 
tion, and that intermediate market structures that provide a combination 
of rents to innovation and competitive pressures will do more to stimulate 
innovation, which suggests that the impact of increased international com- 
petition depends on whether the industry initially has more or less than 
the optimal balance of rents and competition. 
A  fourth  impact could  occur  because  of  economies of  scale. Once 
knowledge is obtained, marginal costs may be close to zero, but obtaining 
knowledge may entail large fixed costs. The implication, as Adam Smith 
recognized long ago, is that the extent of the market can play a crucial 
role in  achieving cost reduction.  Firms innovating  for global  markets, 
therefore, may be  able to realize these scale economies far better than 
those confined to local markets. Indeed, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) 
have demonstrated how increased economic integration can cause a per- 
manent increase in the worldwide rate of growth. 
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will affect resource allocation and the returns from particular productive 
activities. In a price-taking small open economy, improvements in  the 
terms of trade will create an incentive to shift resources toward export in- 
dustries and away from import-competing industries. Similar effects might 
occur as a result of the reduction of trade barriers. Under these circum- 
stances, in the short run, export industries would become more profitable, 
while import-competing sectors would become less profitable. The volume 
of trade rises, but the incentives to invest, in both innovation and in phys- 
ical capital in exports and import-competing industries, would be very 
different. If  new  investment embodied  new technologies, we  would not 
find it surprising that until resources had been reallocated, productivity 
growth was particularly rapid in export industries and sluggish in those 
competing with imports. Research and development (R&D) spending and 
other innovation activity could, similarly, follow the same patterns. 
There are paradigms that are different from those of traditional profit 
maximization in which managers may be stimulated to innovate when in- 
ternational competition threatens their rents. This involves the existence 
of managers who satisfice rather than maximize and behave under condi- 
tions of what is sometimes termed bounded rationality. Basically, they do 
not innovate continuously, but do so when subjected to an unusual stimu- 
lus. In this world, increased import competition may spur competition, 
while the greater profitability of exports could actually do the re~erse.~ 
Thus far I have considered innovation in general. But assuming that 
international competition does stimulate innovation, there is also an issue 
of  the direction  in  which  innovation  is  likely  to  occur-in  particular, 
whether innovation will be biased toward saving particular factors of pro- 
duction. The rewards to improvements in production technology will re- 
late to the benefits from cost reduction it brings about.4  These benefits will 
depend on (1) the relative costs of performing the research to save on the 
use of particular factors, (2) the share of particular factors in costs, and 
(3)  the scale of  output-the  benefits of reducing unit costs are larger, the 
larger the scale of operation. If there are fixed costs in discovering a way 
to make unskilled labor more attractive (e.g., investing in discovering the 
best training methods), it will be more attractive to undertake such discov- 
eries, the greater the share of unskilled labor in the production process. 
This suggests that if international trade raises the incentives to innovate 
in a particular industry, it could also stimulate changes that save on the 
factor of production used relatively intensively in that ind~stry.~ 
International trade may also increase awareness of alternative technolo- 
3. See Rodrik (1992). 
4. For a discussion of factor bias see Binswanger (1974). 
5. Adrian Wood (1994) has suggested that competition with developing countries could 
induce skill-biased technological change. He argues that competitive pressures induce pro- 
ducers of unskilled-intensive products to automate, that is, to use factors that are relatively 
cheaper in developed countries (i.e., capital and skilled labor). But, as Wood realizes, this Impact of International Competition on Technological Change  201 
gies in a particular direction. In the case of competition with other devel- 
oped countries, the technologies may or may not have a particular factor 
bias. However, since developing countries are unlikely to be pioneering 
more skill-intensive or automated production technologies, the channel 
that operates through emulation is unlikely to lead to greater automation 
when developed countries experience competition from developing coun- 
tries. We would not expect technological changes in developed countries 
such as the United States to use more capital- or skill-intensive production 
methods when experiencing competition from developing countries. 
This discussion has focused on the direct impact of international com- 
petition  on industry-specific innovation.  It should be  noted,  however, 
that there may also be general equilibrium effects. To the degree that in- 
creased import competition with labor-intensive products operates through 
Stolper-Samuelson effects to raise the relative cost of skilled and educated 
workers, we  might expect technological change to save on other factors 
and to use unskilled labor more intensively throughout the economy. What 
we  have seen in the United States, for example, is that the use  ratio of 
skilled workers has increased  and the wage  of  skilled workers has in- 
creased. This implies necessarily that the share of skilled workers in the 
wage bill has increased. If  an invention can save a certain quantity of 
more-skilled labor, therefore, it will become more attractive. So we might 
expect that the bias that will result from the relative price effects will tend 
to result in relatively more-skilled-labor-saving technical change. 
In sum, therefore, expanded trade could subject domestic U.S. indus- 
tries to price pressures. These pressures, in turn, could stimulate innova- 
tion and inspire emulation. But they could, by lowering profitability and the 
scale of operations, reduce innovation. In addition, trade could alter the 
costs  and incentives for  both  neutral  and factor-biased  technological 
change. 
However, undertaking empirical work  is not easy. It is important to 
make clear what we mean by technological change. In this study, the term 
implies a change in the production function, that is, the set of available 
technologies of production, and not resource shifts among known tech- 
nologies. In practice, however, it is difficult to distinguish outward shifts 
in the production function from the effects of changes in the composition 
of output. Trade may be expected to induce increased specialization-a 
phenomenon that could occur within as well as between industries. For 
example, if international competition induced a U.S. automobile firm to 
outsource its labor-intensive parts production to Mexico, measured pro- 
ductivity might rise, but this might reflect a change in  activities, rather 
than a technological improvement. 
requires the additional assumption that the actors were previously operating under bounded 
rationality because it raises the question of why they were not moved to adopt these tech- 
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Similarly, increased competition could lead to the elimination of  the 
least efficient firms and the expansion of  the more productive firms- 
again, not necessarily innovation-but  this could shift recorded produc- 
tivity for some period of time. 
Third, in models of imperfect competition, firms with pricing power 
will  have markups that depend on the demand elasticity that they face. 
The impact of  increased competition will  be  to reduce these markups, 
raise output, and increase levels of capacity use. This again would induce 
a one-time shift that raises productivity, but need not reflect a technologi- 
cal improvement. 
Finally, it should be noted that even if we  could obtain precise estimates 
of  the impact of trade on technological change, inferring the impact of 
these changes on wages is by  no means straightforward. In some models, 
in which product demand is perfectly elastic, the sectoral incidence of the 
change is all that matters; in other cases, it is factor bias.6 
6.2  Previous Studies 
There is  anecdotal and case-study evidence on the impact of  import 
competition on innovation in the United States (see MacDonald  1994; 
McKinsey 1992; Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow 1989). In particular, there 
are accounts of the changes brought about by competition in U.S. indus- 
tries such as automobiles, steel, and copier machines7 There have  also 
been  studies of  the impact of  trade on R&D spending-presumably  a 
leading indicator of future productivity growth. Using detailed case stud- 
ies and more general regression analysis, for example, Scherer (1 992) and 
Scherer and Huh (1992) have studied U.S. firms’ R&D-spending responses 
to international  competition.  They  find  a mixture of  responses.  Some 
firms aggressively innovated in the face of competition; others simply sub- 
mitted. On average, however, in the short run, R&D-to-sales ratios de- 
clined. Companies were more aggressive the greater their domestic sales, 
the more concentrated the markets in which they competed, and the more 
diversified their domestic operations. Companies with only U.S. opera- 
tions were more submissive than those with multinational holdings. Zietz 
and Fayissa (1992) have tested the impact of import competition on R&D 
expenditure in the United States and found an association that is positive, 
but only for high-tech industries.8 
6.  See Krugman (2000) and Learner (1998,2000). 
7. There is also evidence that competition  has affected price-cost margins. Domowitz, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986) found that imports affected prices, but according to MacDon- 
ald (1994, 721) these effects tend to be small, even in concentrated industries. 
8. Benjamin and Ferrantino (1998) examine a sample of countries in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and find a positive association between productiv- 
ity growth and export performance, but no association between import growth and produc- 
tivity. Impact of International Competition on Technological Change  203 
These considerations suggest that responses to trade could be different, 
depending on the degree of competition in the market.9  These studies sug- 
gest that sometimes the spur of competition seems to help, particularly 
when there are reasons to suspect the domestic industry might have be- 
come complacent or when it has some surplus that it could allocate to in- 
creased R&D. Indeed, MacDonald (1994) found that in the United States, 
increases in import competition led  to large statistically significant in- 
creases in labor-productivity growth in highly concentrated industries, but 
not in other industries.I0 
In sum, therefore, the literature suggests that trade might have stimu- 
lated R&D and technological change, particularly in concentrated import- 
competing sectors. However, there remain  many unsettled issues. First, 
these studies did not use measures of TFP as the measure of technology. 
As previously noted, if trade leads to the elimination of particularly labor- 
intensive activities, average industry labor productivity might rise, but this 
would not indicate technological change. The same would be true if trade 
induced increased investment."  Second, the studies model trade as oper- 
ating through the impact on quantities. To be sure, this is one way to capture 
trade pressures, but price channels might also be important. Indeed, im- 
port competition could depress profit margins, thereby inducing less tech- 
nological change even where actual trade volumes are small. Third, there 
seems to have been little work on the effects of trade on the bias of techno- 
logical change. This study, therefore, will try to make progress in dealing 
with these deficiencies. The following section will consider the impact of 
trade on TFP in U.S.  manufacturing during the 1980s using both price 
and quantity measures of import competition. The next section will ex- 
plore skill-biased technological change. 
6.3  Trade and Total Factor Productivity Growth 
6.3.1  Regression Model 
Consider a regression model in which technological change, measured 
by  TFP growth in U.S. manufacturing industries, is driven by  domestic 
R&D  intensity  (R&D), industry  concentration  (CONC), international 
9. U.S. imports from developing countries typically occur in sectors that are highly com- 
petitive, such as apparel and leather. It is thus less likely that the technology-inducing effects 
of the developing countries' imports will be significant. In contrast, these effects may be more 
important for trade with developed countries, more of which occurs in concentrated sectors. 
10. Macdonald uses a model in which labor productivity growth in measured over 4-year 
time spans. These are regressed on the average growth in output, concentration, the change 
in import penetration growth in earlier period, an interaction of import penetration growth 
and concentration, and time dummies and other industry characteristics. 
11. Indeed, Collins and Bosworth (1996) find that increased investment rather than higher 
TFP  explains most of the association between growth and openness. 204  Robert Z. Lawrence 
competition (T),  and the interaction between concentration and competi- 
tion (CONC*T): 
TFP  =  a, +  u,R&D  -t u,CONC i-  u,T  + u,CONC*T. 
The incorporation of R&D as a determinant of productivity growth is 
straightforward. As the previous discussion makes clear, a less competitive 
market structure could be associated with innovation or it might detract 
from technological development. This structure is best captured by a mea- 
sure of concentration. Capturing the impact of trade is more difficult. Tra- 
ditionally, quantitative measures of  imports, exports, and the trade bal- 
ance have been used in productivity regressions. In this research, however, 
these will be supplemented by trade price measures. 
Using either import prices or quantities as an independent variable, 
however, is problematic because these variables are not exogenous. This 
means that a credible estimate should control for the impact of joint cau- 
sation. This will be done using a two-stage estimation procedure with in- 
strumental variables techniques. In particular,  for instrumenting import 
prices, a foreign cost index has been constructed by using industry-specific 
source-weighted foreign wholesale price indexes expressed in  U.S. dol- 
lars.I2  Similarly, the endogeneity of import quantities will be controlled for 
with instrumental variables using a number of measures designed to cap- 
ture the factor intensity of production, such as the skill ratio (skill inten- 
sity) and the ratio of plant and equipment (capital intensity), which are 
suggested by the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory as likely determinants of 
trade. Finally, overall productivity growth (and changes in the relative use 
of skilled labor) could differ depending on whether competition originated 
from developed or developing countries. Thus, the specification will dif- 
ferentiate imports by their origins. 
6.3.2  Data 
The data are primarily from the NBER Manufacturing Database, which 
contains data drawn from the annual survey of manufacturing for U.S. 
industries at the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level. 
These data include estimates of TFP export volumes, and import volumes. 
Trade price data are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
estimates on employment by education from the Current Population Sur- 
veys (CPS) tapes, concentration ratios and R&D spending from Scherer 
(1992), imports by  country from Sachs and Shatz (1994),  and national 
wholesale prices and exchange rates from the International Financial Sta- 
tistics of the International Monetary Fund. 
12. Import shares in 1985 are used as weights. A similar methodology was used by Revenga 
(1992) to estimate the impact of trade on wages. Impact of International Competition on Technological Change  205 
6.3.3  Results 
Import Prices 
Table 6.1 reports the regression analysis undertaken for 27 three-digit 
industries for which import price data are a~ai1able.l~  The TFP variable is 
the annual average change over the period of estimation. In regression 1, 
there is a negative relationship between TFP growth and import prices, 
which is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. The coefficient is 
sizable-each  1 percent fall in import prices induces a 0.21 percent rise in 
TFP. This regression suggests that competitive pressures induce techno- 
logical change. However, since it is run in OLS, the regression could also 
reflect contamination by a common global technological shock, which in- 
duces a spurious correlation, or a  shock located  in  the United  States, 
which  induces  foreigners to lower their  prices. In particular,  since the 
United States is a large market, faster productivity growth and thus lower 
U.S. prices could induce lower import prices. 
Indeed, regression 2 casts some doubt on the confidence we can place 
in the result that trade induces faster productivity growth. Once simul- 
taneity is  accounted for using the weighted foreign wholesale prices as 
an instrument, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant (although 
it does become larger). In contrast to regression 1, this result suggests no 
independent impact operating through the impact on prices. However, it 
should be noted that unfortunately  the wholesale price instrument is  a 
weak one, so that this is not a result in which we  can have much confi- 
dence. In addition, we find that interacting the import price variable with 
the concentration variables has the effect of eliminating the significance of 
the import price variable (regression 3). An F-test on the import price var- 
iable and the interaction with concentration together is not significant. 
The computer industry has been dummied out of the sample, since its 
productivity growth is so large that it could overwhelm the results. If the 
computer industry is added to the sample, the coefficient on import prices 
in the OLS version of the regression increases to 0.5  1 and is again signifi- 
cant. In addition, the coefficient on R&D also becomes significant. How- 
ever, in this case as well, the coefficient loses its significance, and it declines 
13. Correlations of the data for the period  1978-89  confirm two key features. First, im- 
ports from developing countries are intensive in less-skilled workers and industries that are 
not concentrated. Imports from poor countries relative to demand in 1978 and changes in 
this measure over the 1980s are positively associated with the share of high school~ducated 
workers in employment (correlation coefficients r of 0.26 and 0.38, respectively). In contrast, 
imports from developed countries in 1978 had almost no relationship to the share of  high 
school-educated employment and changes in these imports were negatively associated with 
this share (r = -0.16).  Imports from developed countries in 1978 were positively associated 
with concentration (r = 0.14), whereas the coefficient for imports from developing countries 
was far lower (r = 0.03). The correlations suggest no systematic relationships between TFP 
growth and skill intensity. The correlation  between TFP growth and the  shares of  high 
schookducated and of production workers in industry employment is very low. 206  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Table 6.1  TFP Change 












































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are (-statistics. 
Variable definitions are as follows: 
TFP80-89 = average annual growth of log total factor productivity from 1980 and 1989. 
Concentration = concentration ratio of the top four firms in  1977. 
R&D = ratio of R&D expenditures to sales in  1977. 
Price change = the average annual growth rate of log import price between 1980 and 1989. 
CR*Price change = interaction term of concentration with price changes. 
D,,,,,,,,  = dummy variable indicating the computer industry. 
WPPI = import-share-weighted change in log PPI in US. dollars. 
The endogenous variable in TSLS is price change. 
*Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
**Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
in magnitude in the instrumental variables estimation. Overall, therefore, 
these results hint at an impact of international competition on productiv- 
ity growth, but it is not a relationship that is robust to specification or the 
use of a weak instrumental variable. 
Import  Quantities 
In table 6.2, annual average TFP growth for 107 three-digit manufactur- 
ing industries during the period  1978-89  is  explained as a function of 
concentration ratios, R&D-to-sales ratio, the share of exports in domestic 
production in the first year of the period, and import shares in domestic 
demand in the first year of  the sample period. In table 6.3, the import- Impact of International Competition on Technological Change  207 
Table 6.2  OLS and TSLS Regressions with First-Year Import Penetration, 1978-89 
Dependent Variable: TFP78-89 
OLS  TSLS  OLS  TSLS 
















































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Variable definitions are as follows: 
TFP78-89 = annual average change in the log of total factor productivity over the period 1978-89. 
Concentration = four-firm concentration ratio in 1977. 
R&D = ratio of R&D to sales in 1977. 
Import78 = ratio of imports to domestic demand (shipments -  exports + imports) in 1978. 
LDC-import78 = ratio of imports from developing countries to domestic demand in 1978. 
DC-import78 = ratio of imports from developed countries to domestic demand in 1978. 
Export/shipments = ratio of exports to domestic shipments in 1978. 
Endogenous variables are Import78, LDC-import78, and Exportlshipments. 
*Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
**Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
demand variables are interacted with the concentration variables. All re- 
gressions are weighted by 1978 levels of employment. Regression 1 in table 
6.2, which is run as OLS, yields a positive and statistically significant co- 
efficient on the share of imports in domestic demand. This result is impor- 
tant and particularly powerful because in general we might expect that, 
ceteris paribus, the United States would tend to have low levels of imports 
in industries in which productivity growth was high; that is, the coefficient 
might well be biased downward. In the previous section, the use of price Table 6.3  OLS and TSLS Regressions with Import Penetration and Its Interaction with 
Concentration Ratio, 1978-89 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Variable definitions are as follows: 
TFP78-89 = annual average change in the log of total factor productivity over the period 1978-89. 
Concentration = four-firm concentration ratio in 1977. 
R&D = ratio of R&D to sales in 1977. 
Import78 = ratio of imports to domestic demand (shipments -  exports + imports) in 1978. 
LDC-import78 = ratio of imports from developing countries to domestic demand in 1978. 
DC-import78 = ratio of imports from developed countries to domestic demand in 1978. 
CR*import78 = interaction of concentration and the share of imports in domestic demand. 
CR*LDC-import78 = interaction of concentration and the share of imports from developing coun- 
CR*DC-import78 = interaction of concentration and the share of imports from developed countries 
Expordshipments = ratio of exports to domestic shipments in 1978. 
Endogenous variables are Import78, LDC-import78, DC-import78, CR*import78, CR*LDC-im- 
tries in domestic demand. 
in domestic demand. 
port78, CR*DC-import78, Export/shipments. Instruments are defined in the appendix. 
*Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
**Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Impact of International Competition on Technological Change  209 
changes as the measure of competitive pressures was biased toward find- 
ing a relationship and gave us reason for suspicion. However,  taken to- 
gether these results appear to confirm a positive effect of import competi- 
tion on TFP growth. The negative coefficient on the export variable, which 
is significant, is surprising. The equation also indicates that the R&D-to- 
sales ratio is a predictor of productivity growth, although it is not signifi- 
cant, and concentration has a negative impact, but again is not significant. 
When imports are separated by origin in this OLS specification, it appears 
that the positive impact is associated both with imports from developing 
and developed countries, although the impact from developing countries 
is larger for any given increase in imports as a share of total demand and 
more statistically significant. 
When the regression is estimated using two-stage least squares (TSLS), 
however, as in the case of the price specification, again the import variable 
loses its significance, although R&D is now significant. Likewise, in the 
TSLS specification the variables that separate imports by origin both lose 
their significance. However, the instruments have low Pstatistics-an  im- 
portant problem which, as discussed in the appendix, gives rise to prob- 
lems in interpretation. Since the import variables used in the regression re- 
flect imports in the first year, the problem of endogeneity is likely to be less 
serious than in the import price specification and it is possible that given 
the weakness of the instruments, the TSLS estimation may do more harm 
than good. This suggests that it is appropriate to place more reliance on 
the OLS results. 
In table 6.3,  the interaction between the concentration ratio and imports 
is explored. Whereas MacDonald (1994) and others have found important 
interactive effects between concentration and import competition, these 
do not emerge strongly here. In regression 1, the significance of the import 
variable and the coefficient on the interaction between imports and con- 
centration is not significant. The regression has also been estimated in a 
TSLS version using factor-intensity instrumental variables for the import 
variable. In this version of the regression, the coefficient on concentration is 
increased, but it is still not significant. When imports are distinguished by 
their origins, the influence of imports from developing countries appears to 
have been more important than that of imports from developed countries. 
However, in both the OLS and the TSLS versions of the regression, the 
coefficients on imports from both developed and developing countries and 
their interaction with concentration are not statistically significant. 
It should also be reported that variables that measured changes in the 
share of imports over the estimation period never came in significant when 
entered alone or when entered in interaction with the concentration ratio. 
This was the case in both the OLS and TSLS specifications. Similarly, 
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mation period were not significant in either the OLS or TSLS estimates 
when entered separately. 
In sum, these results provide some indication that international compe- 
tition with imports has raised productivity growth. It is interesting to esti- 
mate the induced impact on productivity growth that  is attributable to 
imports and to ask whether these induced effects tended to increase or re- 
duce the relative wages of unskilled workers. To undertake these estimates, 
I have used the OLS regressions in table 6.2, which produced significant 
effects for the impact of trade. 
In the first set of calculations I derive estimates for each industry of the 
impact on TFP growth due to imports from all sources by multiplying the 
1978 share of imports in total demand by a coefficient of 0.044. Weighted 
by  employment, on average, TFP growth in these manufacturing indus- 
tries was increased at an annual rate of 0.355 percent. When weighted by 
employment of the high schookducated, the impact was 0.36 percent, 
that is, slightly higher than the effect when weighted by  employment of 
the college-educated, 0.34 percent. A regression of the estimated impact of 
imports against the share of high schookducated employment weighted 
by  1978 employment confirms that there was a positive relationship be- 
tween the induced impact of imports and the use of unskilled labor, but it 
is not statistically significant. 
In a second set of calculations I use the separate estimated effects of 
imports from developed and developing countries. For developed coun- 
tries, the mean impact weighted by employment was 0.203 percent annu- 
ally,  larger than the weighted mean impact for imports from developed 
countries of 0.157 percent annually. For developing countries, the impact 
of trade when weighted by  employment of workers with a high school 
education or less, 0.217 percent, was larger than the impact when weighted 
by  employment of workers with a college education, 0.168 percent. In 
contrast, the impact of trade with developed countries was larger when 
weighted by college-educated workers, 0.163 percent, than when weighted 
by  high  school-educated  workers,  0.155  percent.  Added  together,  we 
obtain estimates of 0.373 percent and 0.331 percent when high school- 
and  college-educated  employment  weights,  respectively,  are  used.  An 
employment-weighted regression of  the estimated  effects due to devel- 
oping country imports against the share of high school-educated workers 
in  employment  yields a  positive and statistically significant coefficient 
(t-statistic = 3), whereas a similar regression for the effects due to devel- 
oped country imports has a negative coefficient that is not significant. All 
told, therefore, it appears as if  imports had a small but positive impact 
on relative productivity growth in unskilled-labor-intensive sectors. The 
estimated impact  of exports on productivity  growth is negative. It also 
turns out that there is a statistically significant negative relationship be- 
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educated employment. Thus, taking account of exports strengthens fur- 
ther the result that trade induced relatively faster productivity growth in 
low-skill industries. 
In  sum, therefore, these results lend support to the conjecture made 
by Wood (1994) that competition with developing countries has induced 
relatively rapid productivity growth in low-skill industries. However, if we 
assume that the relevant model for relating this effect to the skill premium 
is the traditional trade model in which world prices are given, we  would 
have expected this effect to have lowered the skill premium (similar to an 
increase in the price of low-skill industries). If we abandon that model and 
assume an inelastic demand for U.S. products produced in low-skill sec- 
tors, we  would be able to raise the estimated role played by  trade in ex- 
plaining the rise of the skill premium. Alternatively, if we  follow Wood 
and assume that by the end of the period all the low-skill goods have ac- 
tually become noncompeting, then this evidence would also support his 
view that without trade, the relative demand for unskilled workers would 
have been higher. 
6.4  Trade and Factor Bias 
There does not appear to have been a strong sectoral bias to total pro- 
ductivity growth.  In  particular,  the correlations between industry TFP 
growth and measures of skill mix, such as the ratio of nonproduction to 
production  workers  or  the  ratio  of  high  schookducated to  college- 
educated workers, is weak. Yet  it is the shift in this mix  within sectors, 
which has been identified with skill-biased technological change, which is 
probably the most important source of the shift in the demand for labor. 
Indeed, CPS data have been used to estimated the ratio of full-time high 
school-educated workers (i.e., workers with a high school diploma or less) 
to college-educated workers (i.e., workers with some college education). 
These indicate that over this decade in the typical three-digit-level man- 
ufacturing  industry  the  shift  averaged  about  1.15  percent  annually. 
Weighted by employment, the shift was 1.1 percent or 12.7 percent over 
the decade. What accounts for this shift? 
One suggested explanation relates to changes in technology-particu- 
larly to the impact of computers. A second relates more broadly to the 
notion that labor-management  relations in manufacturing have changed 
as a result of production methods that demand more-skilled workers. A 
third possibility is that the shift has somehow been induced by interna- 
tional competition, that technology has shifted in manufacturing to econ- 
omize on the use of production workers. In addition, however, there is a 
fourth possibility-that  the data reflect mix effects because the interna- 
tional outsourcing of production worker employment has led to a concen- 
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that firms have simply become “fat and mean.” As David Gordon (1996) 
argued, in response to increased competitive pressures, U.S.  firms have 
reacted by laying off their blue-collar workers, but at the same time have 
actually added more white-collar labor. 
It is also important in thinking about this issue to distinguish between 
technological change and technological progress. This is particularly the 
case because  productivity  growth in the manufacturing sector has not 
been particularly rapid. If the “fat and mean” hypothesis is correct, for 
example, there might have been change, but not necessarily progress. 
6.4.1  Evidence 
There is evidence that some of the change is driven by new investments 
and R&D. Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) found that 40 percent of 
the shift toward nonproduction labor can be attributed to the introduction 
of computers during the 1980s. (Similarly, they found that entered alone 
in a regression, R&D spending accounts for just under 40 percent of the 
shift, and that taken together the R&D and computer variables account 
for  about  one-half  of  the shift  away  from production  labor.) Krueger 
(1993) has found evidence linking wages and computer investment. Allen 
(1  996) reports that returns to schooling and the wage gap between high 
school and college graduates increased much more in industries with a 
rising employment share of scientists and engineers than in other indus- 
tries. He concludes that R&D activity has had an impact on relative earn- 
ings across a broad range of occupations and that the employment of col- 
lege graduates increased most in industries with rising R&D.I4 Similarly 
Mincer (1991) found that the ratio of earnings of college graduates to 
earnings of high school graduates increased with R&D intensity. 
There is also some empirical support for a role for trade. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) find that the rise in import penetration explains about  15 
percent of the increase in the share in the wage bill of manufacturing dur- 
ing 1979-90 (although in some regressions they obtain higher effects). This 
result could be capturing changes in the ratio of production to nonproduc- 
tion workers as well as their relative wages. Bernard and Jensen (1997) find 
that exporting explains a rise in skill intensity both because it increases 
growth in skill-intensive plants and because it induces a rise in skill inten- 
sity within export plants. 
The literature also suggests that the distinction between technological 
change and technological progress could be important. In particular, while 
there are positive associations between the rising skill intensity and com- 
puters and capital-equipment investment, the link between these invest- 
14. Allen finds that about 25 percent of the growth in the wage gap between college and 
high school graduates in an average industry can be explained by  technological  change 
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ments and hiring decisions and productivity growth is much less apparent. 
Indeed, according to Berndt and Morrison (1995), increases in the share 
of high-tech office equipment in capital are negatively correlated with the 
growth in multifactor productivity, and there is only limited evidence of a 
positive impact on profitability. Allen (1996) reports that accelerating TFP 
growth is correlated with increased employment shares for high school 
graduates and lower employment shares for college graduates and high 
school dropo~ts.’~  These are grist for the mill of the “fat and mean” hy- 
pothesis advanced by Gordon (1996). 
6.4.2  Results 
The simple correlation coefficients among the variables to be  used in 
the regression analysis are interesting. The correlation between changes in 
the share of high school-educated workers and the ratio of high school- 
to college-educated workers in 1979 is positive (0.30). Similarly, high R&D 
and increases in capital intensity are associated with reductions in the high 
school-educated share: r = -0.4  for R&D and r = -0.31  for changes in 
the ratio of capital to output. Variables that reflect the notion of “fat and 
mean” are also significant. Concentration is associated with a rise in more- 
educated workers (r = 0.36), while changes in TFP are associated with in- 
creases in the ratio of high school-educated workers rather than the re- 
verse (r = 0.23). Finally, the role of imports is less significant, particularly 
those from developing countries. Imports may  be leading to upskilling 
(greater skill intensity), but  the effect appears to be due to trade with 
developed countries (r = 0.23) rather than developing countries (r = 0.04). 
This correlation analysis suggests, therefore, that the increase in skill 
intensity has been particularly rapid in skill- and R&D-intensive sectors 
in which investment has been strong and in which competition, particu- 
larly in imports from developed countries, play a role. However, perhaps 
somewhat paradoxically, TFP has not been strong. 
Table 6.4 reports the regression analysis. These use data on 107 three- 
digit manufacturing industries to explain changes in  the  ratio of high 
schookducated to college-educated workers (as measured by the change 
in the share of high school-educated workers). In this TSLS regression, var- 
iables are weighted by  1978 employment, and several variables have strong 
explanatory power. High initial shares of high schookducated workers 
are associated positively with  changes in  the  ratio  of  high  school-  to 
college-educated workers (HS/COL). In other words, the declines in HS/ 
COL tend to be large in skill-intensive industries. Increases in capital in- 
tensity are associated with statistically significant declines in the HS/COL 
ratio, supporting the notion of the complementarity between capital goods 
15. For a more complete discussion of the impact of computers on productivity see Lan- 
dauer (1995). Table 6.4  Changes in Employment Share of High School-Educated  Workers, 1978-89 
Dependent Variable: Change in HS/COL 
Equation 1, TSLS  Equation 2, TSLS 
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Note; Numbers in parentheses are ?-statistics. 
Variable definitions are as follows: 
Change in HSlCOL = average annual change in the share of workers with high school education or 
High-school-share79 = share of workers with high school education or less in 1979. 
Change in output = average annual change in log output. 
Change in capital/output = average annual change in log(capital/output). 
Concentration = concentration ratio in 1997. 
R&D = ratio of R&D spending to sales in 1977. 
Import78 = share of imports in domestic demand in 1978. 
Change in imports = annual average change in share of imports in domestic demand over the pe- 
DC-import78 = share of imports from developed countries in domestic demand in 1989. 
LDC-import78 = share of imports from developing countries in domestic demand in 1989. 
Change in LDC-imports = average annual change in the share of imports from developing countries 
Change in DC-imports = average annual change in the share of imports from developed countries 
Endogenous variables are Change in output, Import78, Change in imports. Instruments are defined 
less, over the period  1979-90. 
riod 1978-89. 
in domestic demand. 
in domestic demand. 
in the appendix. 
*Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
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investment and the demand for skilled labor. Concentration is associated 
with declines in the HS/COL ratio (although the variable is not quite sig- 
nificant). Initial R&D intensity is not significant. Rapid increases in indus- 
try output are an additional  significant variable-indicating  it was  the 
industries that were expanding that increased their skill ratios most. These 
variables, which account for most of the explanatory power, are consistent 
with the hypothesis that technical progress in high-skill industries associ- 
ated with investment was driving the declines in HS/COL. 
What role does trade play? Again, we  have treated levels and changes 
in the ratio of imports to domestic demand as well  as output growth as 
endogenous variables using the same instruments as in the previous regres- 
sions. The ratio of imports to domestic demand in 1978 is significant in 
the regression. This indicates that increases in the skill ratio were particu- 
larly rapid  in  industries with high levels  of imports in  1978. However, 
changes in imports over the period are not significant. International com- 
petition appears to have played some role in shifting demand toward col- 
lege graduates, and the impact does not appear to be due simply to the 
mix effects induced because of imports. Indeed, this result emerges even 
more clearly in regression 2, which differentiates imports by  origin. The 
coefficient on the import share from developed countries is larger than 
that on imports in the TSLS estimation, although the t-statistic drops to 
1.6. The import share of imports from developing countries is not signifi- 
cant. Nor is growth in  imports from developing or developed countries 
associated with a statistically significant decline in the HS/COL ratio. Ap- 
parently, again, mix  effects associated with increases in imports do not 
appear to be significant. Overall, therefore, there is some evidence of an 
association between imports from developed countries and a decline in 
the HS/COL ratio. 
The coefficients from regression  1 can be used to estimate the overall 
impact of import competition from developed countries. Recall that over 
the period, the employment-weighted annual average decline in the share 
of high school-educated workers in manufacturing was 1.1 percent. Using 
the equation to estimate the employment-weighted average change attrib- 
utable to imports suggests that it averaged 0.53 percent, about one-half of 
the overall change in manufacturing. 
However, this shift needs in turn to be related to the economywide HS/ 
COL ratios to derive an estimate of the impact on relative wages. In 1979, 
for  example,  manufacturing  accounted  for  about  28  percent  of  high 
school-educated employment in the economy. Thus a decline in the share 
by 7.4 percent, which is the estimated impact of the induced change in the 
skill ratio due to trade, would represent a decline in overall high school- 
educated employment of  2 percent and a decline in the HS/COL ratio 
economywide of 4 percent. In a model with unitary elasticities of substitu- 
tion, therefore, this would explain a similar 4 percent rise in the skill pre- 
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6.5  Concluding Comments 
This study has explored the impact of international competition  on 
technological change as reflected in changes in total factor productivity 
and the skill ratio in U.S. manufacturing during the period 1978-89. The 
theoretical survey suggests that the effects of such competition could be 
positive or negative, with the response hinging on, among other factors, 
the competitive structure of the industry. Indeed, other empirical studies 
have found market structure important in  determining the response of 
R&D spending and labor productivity to import competition. The empiri- 
cal investigation here confirmed that international competition can affect 
total productivity growth. It also shows the importance of differentiating 
between imports from developed and developing countries. 
Both the price and the quantity proxies for international competition 
produced statistically significant effects. In particular, trade with develop- 
ing countries appears to have stimulated relatively faster TFP growth in 
industries with a relatively large share of imports from developing coun- 
tries. Since such industries also employ relatively higher shares of workers 
with a high school education or less, this implies that international compe- 
tition has led to relatively faster productivity growth in unskilled-labor- 
intensive sectors. In models with perfectly elastic product demand, this 
lowers the skill premium, suggesting that taking account of this impact 
would lower the role played by trade in explaining the skill premium. 
In contrast to the case of TFP, exposure to competition with developed, 
rather than developing countries was associated with a more rapid  in- 
crease in the ratio of high school- to college-educated employment, an im- 
pact that could have reduced the demand for unskilled workers and raised 
the skill premium. 
In many of the regressions run for this study, most of which are not 
reported, there was, surprisingly, no evidence that increased imports from 
developed or developing countries were associated with a shift in the mix 
of U.S. output within industries toward relatively less-labor-intensive pro- 
duction methods. In both OLS and TSLS specifications, changes in the 
share of imports were not statistically significant. 
It is appropriate to emphasize the tentative nature of these conclusions. 
The results obtained here are clearly very sensitive to specification and 
estimation technique. Theory suggests that causation runs between inter- 
national competition and technological change in both directions, and the 
dramatic differences in results using OLS and TSLS confirm the power of 
this interdependence.  Since, in general, we  were only able to find weak 
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Appendix 
Methodological Issues Related to Two-Stage 
Least Squares Estimation 
In  the regressions in this paper, endogeneity of the variables creates a 
problem that casts doubt on the validity of the OLS estimation method, 
which we  attempt to deal with by  using TSLS. In selecting appropriate 
instrumental variables for explaining trade quantities, variables represent- 
ing the factor characteristics of production have been used. The prospec- 
tive instrumental variables are searched within three categories of vari- 
ables, namely, the human capital intensity, physical capital intensity, and 
labor intensity. We have variables of shs79 (the share of workers with high 
school education or less in 1979) and dZhsed (the log growth rate of workers 
with high school education or less) to represent human capital intensities of 
the products. We also have ky78 (capital intensity per output in 1978),py78 
(plants per output in 1978), and ey78 (equipment per output in 1978) to 
reflect the physical capital intensities of the products.  Furthermore,  we 
regard the variables of pvship (the proportion of wage income in the total 
value of shipments in 1978) andppern (the proportion of production work- 
ers in total employment in  1978) as indicating the labor intensity of the 
products. In table 6.1, we use WPPZ (import-share weighted change in log 
PPI in U.S. dollars) as an instrument for price change (log import-price 
change). 
One  critical  issue  associated  with  using  instrumental  variables  is 
whether those instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous vari- 
able, that is, the relevance of instrumental variables.I6  To test the relevance 
of an exogenous variable as an instrumental variable to a particular endog- 
enous variable in the regression equation, we regress that endogenous vari- 
able on the instrumental variable and the other right-hand-side variables 
in the regression equation. If the coefficient of the instrumental variable is 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level and/or the first- 
stage F-statistic is reasonably large (e.g., greater than lo), then this instru- 
mental variable would be regarded as relevant or strong; otherwise it is 
regarded as irrelevant or weak. Unfortunately, we were generally only able 
to obtain weak instruments. 
Given that the instrumental variables are in general not strong, in all 
the regressions we need to be concerned with the estimator bias caused by 
weak instruments in TSLS regressions. Staiger and Stock (1997) develop 
an asymptotic distribution theory for single-equation instrumental vari- 
ables regressions when the instruments are weak. They suggest that com- 
pared with TSLS estimators, the LIML (limited-information maximum- 
16. For  a discussion of  these issues see Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), Brundy and 
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likelihood) estimator shows a smaller bias since the LIML estimator rap- 
idly becomes median unbiased. They thus reach a constructive conclusion, 
for the applied work with one endogenous variable in the right-hand side 
of the single equation, that estimator bias is less of a problem for LIML 
than TSLS, so that the LIML estimator may be a better choice. We have 
undertaken LIML estimates particularly for those regressions that include 
only one right-hand-side endogenous variable and find that the estimation 
results are qualitatively equivalent to those of TSLS. Nonetheless,  the 
presence of weak instruments remains a problem in this study. 
References 
Allen, Steven G. 1996. Technology and the wage structure. NBER Working Paper 
no. 5534. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, April. 
Benjamin, Nancy, and Michael J.  Ferrantino.  1998. Trade, trade policy and pro- 
ductivity growth in OECD manufacturing. Working Paper no. 98-03-A. Wash- 
ington, D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission, March. 
Berman, Eli, John Bound, and Zvi Griliches. 1994. Changes in the demand for 
skilled labor within U.S. manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 109 (2): 367-97. 
Bernard, Andrew B., and J. Bradford Jensen. 1997. Exporters, skill upgrading, and 
the wage gap. Journal of  International Economics 42 (1-2):  3-31. 
Berndt, Ernst R., and Catherine J.  Morrison. 1995. High-tech capital formation 
and economic performance in U.S. manufacturing industries: An exploratory 
analysis. Journal of  Econometrics 65:9-43. 
Binswanger, Hans. 1974. A microeconomic approach to induced innovation. Eco- 
nomic Journal 84:940-58. 
Bound, J., D. Jaeger, and R. Baker. 1995. Problems with instrumental variables 
estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous 
explanatory variable is weak. Journal of  the American Statistical Association 90: 
443-50. 
Brundy, James M., and Dale W.  Jorgenson. 1971. Efficient estimation of simultane- 
ous equations by  instrumental variables. Review of  Economics and Statistics 53 
(3): 207-24. 
Chamberlain, Gary, and Guido W.  Imbens. 1996. Hierarchical Bayes models with 
many instrumental variables. NBER Technical Working Paper no. 204. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Collins, Susan M., and Barry P.  Bosworth. 1996. Economic growth in East Asia: 
Accumulation  versus  assimilation.  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity, 
no. 2:  135-91. 
Deardorff, Alan, and Dalia Hakura. 1994. Trade and wages: What are the ques- 
tions? In Trade and wages: Leveling wages down? ed. Jagdish Bhagwati and Mar- 
vin Kosters, 76-107.  Washington, D.C.: AEI Press. 
Dertouzos, Michael L., Richard K. Lester, and Robert M. Solow. 1989. Mude in 
America: Regaining the competitive edge. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Domowitz, Ian, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen. 1986. Business cycles 
and the  relationship  between concentration  and price-cost margins.  RAND 
Journal of  Economics 17 (1): 1-17. Impact of International Competition on Technological Change  219 
Feenstra,  Robert,  and Gordon Hanson.  1999. The impact of outsourcing and 
high-technology capital on wages: Estimates for the United States, 1979-1990. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3): 907-40. 
Gordon, David M. 1996. Fat and mean: The corporate squeeze of  working Ameri- 
cans and the myth of managerial “downsizing.” New York: Martin Kessler/Free 
Press. 
Kapstein, Ethan. 1996. Workers and the world economy. Foreign Afsairs 75 (3): 
Krueger, Alan  B.  1993. How computers have changed the wage structure: Evi- 
dence from microdata, 1984-89.  Quarterly Journal of  Economics 108:33-60. 
Krueger, Anne 0. 1980. Protectionist pressures, imports and employment in the 
United States. NBER Working Paper no. 461. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bu- 
reau of Economic Research. 
Krugman, Paul. 2000. Technology, trade and factor prices. Journal of  International 
Economics 50 (1): 51-71. 
Landauer, Thomas K. 1995. The trouble with computers. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Learner, Edward. 1998. In search of Stolper-Samuelson linkages between interna- 
tional trade and lower wages. In Imports, exports and the American workec ed. 
Susan Collins, 141-202.  Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
.2000. What’s the use of factor contents? Journalof International Economics 
50 (1): 17-49. 
MacDonald, James M. 1994. Does import competition force efficient production? 
Review of  Economics and Statistics 76 (4): 721-27. 
McKinsey Global Institute.  1992. Service sector productivity.  Washington D.C.: 
McKinsey Global Institute. 
Mincer, Jacob. 1991. Human capital responses to technological change in the labor 
market. NBER Working Paper no. 3207. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Revenga, Ana L. 1992. Exporting jobs? The impact of import competition on em- 
ployment and wages in U.S. manufacturing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 
(1): 255-82. 
Rivera-Batiz, Luis A., and Paul M. Romer. 1991. International trade with endoge- 
nous technological change. NBER Working Paper no. 3594. Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, January. 
Rodrik, Dani.  1992. The limits of trade policy reform in developing countries. 
Journal of  Economic Perspectives 6:87-106. 
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Howard Shatz. 1994. Trade and jobs in U.S. manufacturing. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1: 1-84. 
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner. 1995. Economic reform and the process of 
global integration. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1: 1-95. 
Scherer, F.  M. 1992. International high-technology competition. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Scherer F.  M., and Keun Huh. 1992. R&D reactions to high-technology import 
competition. Review of  Economics and Statistics 74 (2): 202-12. 
Staiger, Douglas,  and James H. Stock.  1997. Instrumental variables regression 
with weak instruments. Econometrica 65 (3): 557-86. 
Wood, Adrian. 1994. North-south trade, employment and inequality. Oxford: Clar- 
endon Press. 
Zietz, Joachim, and Bichaka Fayissa. 1992. R&D expenditure and import compe- 
tition: Some evidence for the U.S. Weltwirtschafiliches Archiv 128 (1): 52-66. 
16-37. 220  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Comment  Alan B. Krueger 
Aristotle recognized that some questions are inherently more difficult to 
answer than others. If these difficult questions are really important, they 
are nonetheless worth trying  to answer, although Aristotle  argued  the 
burden of proof that one applies would need to be relaxed in these cases. 
The topic of this paper is unquestionably important. In the long run, pro- 
ductivity growth is (almost) everything. Trade may influence productivity 
growth in a number of subtle and not so subtle ways, outlined by Robert 
Lawrence in his provocative paper. But the causal effect of trade on pro- 
ductivity is extremely difficult to determine. It is unclear whether much 
headway can be made. 
To see the conceptual difficulty in ascertaining the effect of foreign com- 
petition on productivity, consider figure 6C. 1, which displays isoquants in 
skilled (L,) and unskilled (LJ  labor space. Initially, the industry can pro- 
duce Q units of output with the combination of labor inputs indicated by 
the isoquant Q,. Given relative wages, firms choose the factorlskill ratio 
L,lLs,, that is, point a. Now suppose there is an exogenous opening of 
trade with a country that is relatively well endowed with less-skilled work- 
ers (e.g., China). Almost everyone would expect this change in interna- 
tional  competition  to  lower  the wage  of  unskilled  workers relative to 
skilled workers through Stolper-Samuelson effects, although there is con- 
siderable debate as to how much relative wages would change. A relative 
decline in unskilled wages would cause the industry to substitute unskilled 
for skilled workers, moving to point b in the diagram. Lawrence rightly 
does not consider this shift to be  a change in productivity  because the 
production function is constant. Instead, he would like to measure shifts 
in the isoquant. That is, suppose productivity increases as a result of the 
stimulus from trade, and the amount of  skilled and unskilled labor re- 
quired to produce the original  Q units of  output in the new regime is 
depicted by  the isoquant Q2.  If the industry maintained its initial factor 
ratios, how much has productivity increased? 
Figure  6C. 1 highlights the considerable difficulties in  answering this 
question. Changes in factor ratios must be accounted for. Lawrence sensi- 
bly uses total factor productivity (TFP) growth to abstract from changes 
in factor shares, but the TFP figures are only an approximation, and the 
approximation  is worse as the elasticity of substitution between inputs 
strays from  1. Since several studies place the elasticity of substitution be- 
tween college- and high schoolkducated workers at around 1.5, using the 
TFP measure will make it appear that trade matters even if  all that has 
happened is that factor shares have shifted with a fixed production tech- 
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Fig. 6C.1  Hypothetical isoquants 
nology.’ Moreover, causation could run in the opposite direction. For rea- 
sons having nothing to with trade, U.S. firms could discover more efficient 
production techniques (shifting the isoquant from Q,  to Q2),  driving down 
the price of the good and causing trade flows to shift. Causality runs from 
technological change to trade, not vice versa. Lawrence uses instrumental 
variables to address the latter problem, but as explained later, there are 
reasons to doubt the validity of the instruments. 
A number of other conceptual and practical problems arise in the sta- 
tistical analysis. Consider, for example, the problem caused by analyzing 
industry-level data that combine different firms and industry segments 
into the same three-digit manufacturing industry. It is likely that increased 
international competition would cause firms to close down their least pro- 
ductive, low-value-added plants, leaving just the high-productivity plants 
to be counted in the data. This selection process will make it seem as if 
international trade raises productivity, while in reality it might just cause 
low-productivity plants to go out of business-the  production function 
is unchanged. 
Also, by focusing on the intensive margin of technological change (i.e., 
producing existing goods better), the paper misses the effect of trade on 
the extensive margin (i.e., discovering new products and producing them 
at all). If the extensive margin is ignored, Marco Polo’s importation of gun- 
powder to the West would be missed, for example. I suspect the extensive 
margin of product innovation and imitation is a major channel through 
1. On the elasticity of substitution between college- and high school-educated  workers, 
see, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992). 222  Robert Z. Lawrence 
which trade affects productivity. Of course, this is empirically a difficult 
topic to study. 
Lawrence does an excellent job of cataloging the sundry ways in which 
trade could affect productivity. The bottom line is that theoretical reason- 
ing provides no clear empirical prediction.  I suspect the relationship be- 
tween trade and technology is even more complicated than his analysis 
suggests. For example, there  could  be  a  “feedback loop” in  which in- 
creased trade causes unskilled workers’ relative wages to decline in  the 
United  States, which in  turn induces companies to generate unskilled- 
labor-using technology, which in turn leads firms to produce more abroad 
because unskilled labor is really cheap abroad, and so on. Moreover, in- 
creased international competition could cause companies to devote re- 
sources to sales and marketing (e.g., more cola wars), instead of to re- 
search and development. Such advertising expenses are unlikely to have a 
beneficial effect on productivity. 
With this background, it would be  surprising if  the empirical results 
were not open to alternative interpretations. Table 6.1 provides perhaps 
the most  tantalizing results  in  the  paper.  These  regressions relate  the 
growth rate of TFP to changes in import prices, industrial concentration, 
and R&D. To address the potential simultaneity problem mentioned pre- 
viously, Lawrence uses a plausible instrumental variable for import prices, 
foreign wholesale prices. Unfortunately, the sample consists of only 27 
industries, so the results are not very precise. The OLS estimates suggest 
that increases in import prices lead to slower TFP growth, while the TSLS 
estimates yield an even larger (but statistically insignificant) negative effect 
of import prices on TFP growth. These coefficient estimates imply large 
economic magnitudes, but the imprecision of the estimates (especially the 
TSLS estimates) render the results almost entirely inconclusive. As I un- 
derstand it, the sample size is restricted because industry price changes 
are only available for a small number of industries. But the reduced-form 
models (i.e., the relationship between TFP growth and wholesale prices) 
could be estimated for a much larger sample of industries. Given the mag- 
nitude  of  the  coefficient  estimates,  I  think  these  estimates  would  be 
worth calculating.2 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 contain the main empirical results of the paper. It 
seems to me, however, that the models estimated in these tables do not ad- 
dress the central question raised by the paper, even if the instruments were 
valid. In particular, the models relate TFP growth to import- and export- 
penetration rates. But the theoretical discussion concerns an increase in 
competition-a  kick in the pants-not  the level of competition. It is quite 
2. I would also note that, unlike the TSLS estimates, the reduced-form models are not 
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possible that the import and export rates reflect steady-state levels, so they 
would provide a poor proxy for any additional stimulus to innovation due 
to new competitive pressures. In other words, there is no new “kick in the 
pants”; the boot is raised no higher than it was in steady state. I would 
think the appropriate explanatory variable would be the change in imports 
or exports. Lawrence reports, however, that when he included the change 
in  imports as an explanatory variable it had a statistically insignificant 
effect. 
For this reason, the results in tables 6.2 and 6.3 strike me as less than 
compelling. In addition, it is unclear to me why the growth rate of workers 
with a high school education or less is an appropriate instrumental vari- 
able for these equations because trade-induced technological change may 
cause a change in factor intensities. Also, as Lawrence notes, it is discon- 
certing that import- and export-penetration rates have opposite effects. In 
my  opinion, it is premature to use  these results to calculate the implied 
effect of trade-induced technological change on the relative demand for 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
Lastly, Lawrence provides an analysis of changes in  the employment 
share of high schoolxducated workers. These results complement a grow- 
ing literature on the determinants of shifts in factor intensities across in- 
dustries (see, e.g., Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998). It is difficult to separate 
out the effect of imports on interindustry skill upgrading from the effects 
of skill-biased technological change due to other sources, however. This 
problem is not solved by  the TSLS estimates; some of the variables that 
Lawrence uses to instrument for imports (e.g., the equipment share) could 
also be used  as instruments for skill-biased technological change. This 
concern notwithstanding, there is the intriguing finding that, across indus- 
tries, relatively more imports from advanced countries are associated with 
employment shifts away from workers with a high school degree or less, 
while imports from less-developed countries are essentially unrelated to 
skill upgrading. 
I am skeptical that cross-industry analyses of  trade and TFP growth 
can yield many definitive answers. In addition to the reservations already 
described, one might expect the creative process that leads to technologi- 
cal innovation to differ across industries. At a particular time, some indus- 
tries have more scope for technological breakthroughs than others. There- 
fore, I think  a sensible way  for future research  in this area to proceed 
would be to look across countries at the same industrial sector. For ex- 
ample, productivity growth in selected sectors could be compared between 
countries that opened up to trade and those that did not open up to trade. 
This type of analysis could be done for many industries. Perhaps there is 
much to be learned from the pattern of industries in which trade leads to 
productivity increases or decreases. I would think building up from such 224  Robert Z. Lawrence 
“case study” research is a more promising route to answering the impor- 
tant question of whether trade influences technological change. 
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